control law attempts to strike a balance between permitting law-abiding citizens to obtain firearms with relative ease and preventing certain categories of presumptively irresponsible people from purchasing and possessing firearms. Those that are conclusively presumed irresponsible include ex-felons, former mental patients, drug addicts, juveniles, and illegal aliens. 5 Both federal substantive criminal law and federal administrative law contribute to the regulatory effort. The former makes it a crime for ex-felons and other ineligible persons to possess a firearm. The federal "felon-in-possession" law makes it a crime for any person convicted of a state or federal felony to possess a firearm; 6 the same prohibition also applies to drug users, former mental patients, and illegal aliens. 7 Such criminal laws, in theory, work ex-ante by deterring exfelons and other ineligibles from purchasing or even possessing a firearm and ex-post by confiscating their weapons and punishing them for unlawful possession. 8 Federal regulatory law, especially the recently enacted Brady law, seeks to regulate firearms transfers in such a way that ineligible persons will not even be able to obtain a firearm and therefore, will never have an opportunity to violate the criminal law. 9 Congress established the federal regulatory foundation in the Gun Control Act of 1968,10 which prohibits the sale of long guns (rifles and shotguns) and handguns to anyone who is: (1) not a resident of the state in which the federal firearms dealer does business;" or (2) under eighteen years ANN. § 790.06 (West Supp. 1995) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2904 26- (Harrison 1993 ; IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Supp. 1995) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-09-101 (1993) ; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321 (1993) ; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 39-7 (West Supp. 1995) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-404 (1993) § 61-7-4 (1992) ; WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104 (Supp. 1995) .
5 There is less consensus on whether firearms should be available as-of-right to all persons who do not fall into the irresponsible categories. In some states and cities, of course, firearms are much more strictly regulated. Not only must a prospective owner not be a member of a disfavored social category, he must convince a law enforcement official that he is a person of good character and has a good reason to possess a firearm. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2313 (1995) ; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 400.00 (McKinney Supp. 1995) ; RuL.Es OF THE Crry OF NEWYORK § 5-02 (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 58-3 (Supp. 1995) . Some commentators have referred to this kind of gun control regulation as restrictive licensing, which is in contrast to permissive licensing. See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 328-32 (1991) .
6 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) (1994) . 7 Id. 8 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (2) (1994) (providing a fine, up to 10 years in prison, or both); 18 U.S.C. § 3665 (1990) (providing for confiscation of firearms possessed by felons).
9 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Star. 1536 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)-(t) (1994)).
10 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994) . 11 § 922(b)(3).
In addition, the Act prohibits the sale of firearms to anyone who is:
(1) under indictment for or has been convicted of a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year";' 3 (2) a fugitive from justice; 14 (3) an illegal narcotics user or addict;' 5 and (4) either an adjudicated mental defective or someone who has been committed to a mental institution. 16 The Act also prohibits those listed under § 922(d) from possessing firearms. 17 In 1987, Congress expanded the category of persons ineligible to purchase or possess firearms to include illegal aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, persons who have renounced United States citizenship, and anyone subject to a restraining order for domestic violence, harassment, or stalking. 18 Under this regulatory scheme, a person who seeks to purchase a handgun from a federally licensed dealer must provide the dealer with a written assurance that he or she is not an ineligible purchaser. 19 It is a criminal offense for a dealer to make a sale without such an assurance, 20 or to knowingly sell a firearm to an ineligible person.
1
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 199322 furthers this regulatory goal by prohibiting federal firearms licensees (FFLs) 23 from selling handguns to persons who fall into a few categories conclusively presumed to be dangerous and/or irresponsible. These categories include ex-felons, adjudicated mental defectives, former mental 12 § 922(b)(1).
'3 § 922(d)(1). 14 § 922(d) (2). "The term fugitive from justice means any person who has fled from any State to avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (15) (1994) .
§ 922(d)(3).

§ 922(d)(4).
§ 922(g) (1)-(4).
§ 922(d) (5)-(8), (g) (5)-(8) (1994)
. The restraining order prohibition applies only if there was a hearing and factual findings by the court issuing the restraining order that the restrained individual represents a threat.
§ 922(s) (1) (A) (i) (a), (3).
20 § 924(a) (5) (providing fine, up to one year imprisonment, or both for knowing failure to comply).
*21 § 924(a) (2) (providing fine, up to 10 years imprisonment, or both for knowing sale to ineligible person).
22 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1586 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)-(t) (1994) ).
23 Federal law prohibits any unlicensed person from engaging in the business of selling firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 923 (a) (1)-(2) (1994) . Individual gun owners who want to sell a few of their guns need not obtain a license, but they may not sell to an ineligible person. Section 922(d) provides that "it shall be unlawful for anyperson to sell... any firearm ... to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person" belongs to one of the prohibited classes. § 922(d) (emphasis added). Violations of § 922(d) are subject to a fine, up to 10 years imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (2).
patients, illegal drug users and addicts, juveniles, persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, persons who renounced U.S. citizenship, and illegal aliens. 2 4 Brady requires that firearms dealers hold off a proposed handgun sale for up to five business days in order for a background check to be carried out by the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) in the jurisdiction where the dealer is located. The purchase and sale may only be consummated if the CLEO notifies the dealer that the would-be purchaser is not ineligible or if five business days pass without a response from the CLEO. It is important to stress that Brady's waiting period and background check provisions apply only to the purchase of handguns. Brady does not apply to rifles and shotguns.
2 5
An article in this Symposium explicitly endorses and recommends reinforcements and extensions of this combined criminal and administrative regulatory system for keeping firearms out of the hands of irresponsible persons. 2 6 Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi and Thomas B. Cole, in Regulating Gun Markets, argue that the gun control legislation applicable to purchases through FFLs should be extended to the secondary gun market. 2 7 While such a proposal may have surface appeal, when one examines the logic, practicality, and effectiveness of keeping firearms out of the "wrong hands" through regulation of the primary market, much less the secondary market, it is hard to be optimistic. This Article questions whether the federal regulatory strategy for regulating firearms purchases or possession is likely to be successful. In so doing, it provides a case study of how regulatory goals far exceed regulatory capacity and thus generate inexorable pressure for more regulation. Section I illuminates the gaps and unenforceability of the regulatory regime governing the purchase and sale of handguns. Section II illuminates the practical difficulties that would be involved in attempting to expand the federal regulatory apparatus over handguns to the secondary market.
25 Francisco Martin Duran, who, in October 1994, sprayed the White House with bullets from an SKS semi-automatic rifle, initially attempted to purchase a handgun but was rejected based on the criminal records check required by Brady. Duran was able to legally purchase a rifle (from the same FFL that rejected his handgun purchase application), because Brady does not apply to long gun sales. Jim Kirksey, Duran Bid to Get a Pistol Rejected, THE DENVER Posr, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al. 26 See Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 90-91 (1995) (proposes extending Brady and other federal gun control laws to the secondary market and regulating federal licensing more stringently).
27 As used by Cook et al., the term "secondary market," includes sales, purchases and transfers of firearms by persons other than FFIs. The term "primary market" means sales, purchases and transfers of firearms by FFLs. Cook et al, supra note 26, at 68-70.
I. REGULATING THE PRIMARY MARKET IN FIREARMS
A.
PASSAGE OF THE BRADY BILL
A few years after John Hinkley's attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan and Press Secretary James Brady on March 30, 1981, proponents of stricter gun control, led by Handgun Control Inc., 28 began a vigorous lobbying effort for a federal law that would prevent criminals, the mentally disturbed, and other irresponsible or dangerous individuals from obtaining handguns. Gun control advocates proposed a waiting period and a background check to be carried out by the CLEO in the particular FFL's jurisdiction to determine whether a prospective gun purchaser fell into one of the ineligible categories. 29 Although it was already a serious felony for an ineligible person to purchase a handgun, supporters of the Brady bill predicted that the bill would save lives by preventing dangerous people from obtaining handguns. This position was seemingly based upon two assumptions: (1) that under the existing regulatory system, ineligible persons were illegally purchasing handguns from FFIs by falsely claiming to be eligible; and (2) that the delay in effectuating the purchase/sale caused by the background check would prevent some misuse of firearms by imposing a "cooling-off period," 3 0 during which time the would-be purchaser, whether eligible or not, would get his or her murderous impulses under control. 3 ' Gun control advocates and 28 Handgun Control, Inc. was founded in the early 1970s. Sarah Brady, James Brady's wife, first became involved with the organization in 1985. OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE 170-75 (1990) . 29 H.R. REP. No. 47, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1991 31 This Article does not deal with the effort to impose a cooling-off period as an independent regulatory strategy aimed, not necessarily at keeping handguns out of the wrong hands, but at making an eligible gun purchaser wait some period of time before effectuating a purchase so that, in the event that the purchase was stimulated by a murderous rage, there would be an opportunity to calm down.
Many (1994) . The statement must contain the would-be purchaser's name, address, and date of birth, as well as an affirmation that the purchaser does not fall into a prohibited category. The prohibited categories include those under indictment for or convicted of a felony, fugitives from justice, illegal drug users or addicts, people who have been committed to a mental institution, illegal aliens, those dishonorably discharged from the military, people who have renounced their citizenship, and people subject to a court order "that restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person...." § 922(d) (1)-(8).
Some of these categories are problematic. For example, the law makes no distinction between violent and non-violent felonies, nor does it provide any time limits. Thus, a thirty year old conviction for car theft would make a person ineligible to purchase a gun. Furthermore, the "drug user" category is ambiguous because the Gun Control Act of 1968 neither defines the term, nor identifies how recent the illegal drug use must be for the would-be handgun purchaser's identification is legitimate, the FEL must forward to the CLEO within one day the completed U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms' (BATF) "Brady Form." 43 The purchase is then delayed until approved by the CLEO, or until five business days have passed without a response from the CLEO, in which case the sale may proceed. 44 There has been some controversy over what kind of background check the CLEO must conduct. The law states only that the CLEO "shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within five business days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever state and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General."45 On its face, this law could mean an effort as cursory as checking local criminal records or as comprehensive as making inquiries of federal, state, local, and private institutions and agencies responsible for dealing with crime, mental health, immigration, and drugs.
The requirement that the CLEO conduct a background check has been challenged by some local law enforcement officials, who claim that, under the Tenth Amendment, Congress lacks authority to require local government officials to set up and carry out federallyimposed regulatory operations. 16 (1990) . Surely the FFL does not have to administer a urine testl And, how would a FFL or CLEO find out if an individual recently took a urine test? Tien and Rich adopted the definition of "drug user" used by the National Institute on Drug Abuse. It defines a current user as anyone who has used drugs within the past month. However, they recognize that "the same individual could be ineligible to purchase a firearm one week, eligible the next, and so on." Id. at 16. 43 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1) (A) (i) (IV). Submission of a potential purchaser's fingerprints is not required. The "Statement of Intent to Obtain A Handgun(s)," referred to as the "Brady Form" by the BATF, also contains an "optional information" section that need not be filled out by the would-be purchaser. The optional information includes social security number, height, weight, sex, and place of birth. The FFL fills out the bottom half of the form, which includes the FEL's name, address, phone number, license number, and the type of identification used by the would-be purchaser, either a driver's license or "other," as well as the driver's license number or identification number. The FFL must also identify the CLEO to whom the form was sent and the method of transmission (phone, fax, in person, or other). BUREAU OP ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, ONE-YEAR PROGRESS RE-PORT: BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENION Acr, App. (Feb. 28, 1995) provision, the government has argued that the meaning of reasonable effort is left to the discretion of each CLEO and that it should be "left to the discretion of the CLEO to establish enforcement standards based upon the jurisdiction's resources which, depending on the area, could entirely negate the research obligation." 4 7 Further, BATF interprets the reasonable effort language as requiring "'some minimal effort to check commonly available records.'" 4 8 Therefore, it seems that a reasonable background check means whatever the CLEO wants it to mean, depending on available resources and the type of records available in that jurisdiction.
Once the background check is complete, and if the sale is approved, all records of the purchaser's application and background check must be destroyed by the CLEO, including the purchaser's statement and any other record containing information derived from that statement. 49 Failure to comply with these provisions is a criminal offense punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 50 If the sale is disapproved and the rejected purchaser requests an explanation, the CLEO must provide the rejected purchaser with a written explanation within twenty days of rejection. 5 1 It is important to note that Brady does not provide for arrest of an ex-felon who has attempted to purchase a handgun. In fact, there is no federal law making attempted possession by a felon a crime. A rejected purchaser can be prosecuted only for making a false statement; if the rejected purchaser lied on the Brady Form regarding a past felony record or one of the disabilities, he could be prosecuted for knowingly making a false statement to an FFL. 52 It is unlikely, however, that a rejected purchaser would be arrested and 
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charged for making false statements. 5 3 As one BATF official stated, "[t]ry getting a U.S. attorney to take that case." 54
C. EVALUATING BRADY
Gun control advocates hailed Brady as the most important federal gun control legislation of this generation. Its passage was greeted with predictions of a safer, more secure society. 55 President Clinton called Brady "step one in taking our streets back, taking our children back, reclaiming our families and our future." 5 6 Sarah Brady said, "It will begin to make a difference. It will begin to save lives." 57 James Brady stated, "What we are witnessing today is more than a bill signing, it is an end of unchecked madness and the commencement of a heart-felt crusade for a safer and saner country." 5 8 Even John Hink-53 Bill Bridgewater, Executive Director for the National Alliance of Stocking Gun Dealers, stated that the people prevented from purchasing a gun by Brady "were only stopped at that store at that time. They weren't arrested. So all they had to do was go out on the street comer at midnight and pay more to get a gun." Fox Butterfield, Surey Reveals Success ofNew Brady Bil4 HoUST. CHRON., March 12, 1995, at Al. According to a CBS News survey of nineteen states, approximately 551 would-be purchasers were arrested by local police. Id. These numbers, however, are questionable. It is not clear whether these individuals were fugitives from justice, or whether they were arrested under the felon-in-possession law, or for making false statements. The most likely explanation for their arrest would be the existence of outstanding warrants for their arrest. No federal agency was able to confirm the accuracy of the CBS survey, but a BATF official agreed that outstanding arrest warrants were the most likely explanation. Telephone Interview with Nancy Cook, Specialist, Firearms and Explosives, Operations Division, BATF (July 13, 1995 Before the Brady law officially went into effect on February 28, 1994, gun control advocates predicted that 100,000 handgun purchases, out of 3.5 million, would be prevented annually. 60 For supporters of Brady, every rejection of a handgun sale to an ineligible person constitutes one less armed and potentially dangerous person to threaten others. One year after Brady became effective, the law was declared a success. According to a survey by BATF, Brady prevented 41,000 people from purchasing handguns. 6 Reagan, RoCKY MouNTAiN NEWS, Feb. 20, 1994 , at 6A. In the year preceding the assassination attempt, Hinkley purchased at least five handguns. Three of these guns were purchased before his misdemeanor conviction in Nashville for boarding a plane carrying three handguns, so these sales would not have been picked up in a background check. Id. Since Brady does not make misdemeanants ineligible for future handgun purchases, Hinkley's subsequent purchase of two more handguns, including the one used in the shooting, would not have been prevented either. Even if Brady had been in effect, Hinkley would have passed the background check because he was not under indictment for or convicted of a felony; he was not an illegal alien, fugitive from justice, or dishonorably discharged; and he had not been certified a mental defective or committed to a mental institution.
60 This prediction was based on extrapolations from statistics compiled by the state of Florida which, prior to Brady, imposed background checks on would-be gun purchasers. Florida conducted 265,440 background checks in 1992 and rejected 2.5% of the would-be sales. Dennis Cauchon, Brady Law is More "Symbolic" Than Substance, USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 1993, at 8A. Florida is the only state to have a constitutionally mandated background check and three day waiting period. FLA. CONST., art. 1, § 8(b) (1991). In California, which has a fifteen day waiting period, of the 500,000 requests for handgun purchases in 1991, 6,000 were rejected; of those, 3,000 rejected purchasers had a prior assault record and thirty-four rejected purchasers had a homicide record. subject to restraining orders; 36 dishonorable dischargees; 23 mental defectives; 2 juveniles; and 1 person who renounced U.S. citizenship. 63 It is unclear whether these numbers include "false positives" or "false hits" based upon mistakes in the name checks and other problems in the data bases and checking procedures. 64 It is possible that the many people found to be ineligible to purchase handguns were misidentified because they had the same name as a person who is ineligible.
Assuming that under the Brady regulatory machinery up to 41,000 would-be handgun sales have been rejected, must we conclude that an equal number of presumptively dangerous persons have been prevented from obtaining handguns? Obviously not. Some percentage of the rejected purchasers already possessed a handgun and were merely attempting to add to their arsenal. 6 5 More importantly, some unknown percentage of rejected purchasers subsequently may have obtained a handgun by submitting a false application to another FFL, by having a "straw man"-an eligible friend or relative-purchase the handgun for him, or by purchasing a handgun on the secondary market. Cook, Molliconi & Cole estimate that "there are roughly as many [private] transactions of used guns as there are sales of new guns, 6 6 ... and that more than half a million guns are stolen each year." 6 7 Dangerous criminals are disproportionately likely to purchase their handguns on the secondary market. A 1986 survey sponsored by the National Institute ofJustice found that five out of six of a sample of gun-owning felons obtained handguns from the secondary market and by theft. 6 8 About 80% of these convicted felons, both gun owners and non-owners alike, believed they would have little difficulty ob- Brady supporters may have underestimated the ease with which this regulatory system can be circumvented and they may have overestimated the ability of government agencies to enforce these regulations. The first difficulty with the current regulatory system is its reliance on the deeply flawed system of federal licensing for gun dealers. Federal law requires that any person who intends to engage in the business of selling firearms must obtain a federal license.
72 But the federal licensing system is all smoke and mirrors. Upon payment of a small fee, practically anyone can obtain a federal license to sell firearms.
7 3 A person must be granted a license 7 4 after submitting to BATF: a photograph and fingerprints, a signed application form 75 declaring that he is over twenty-one years and not ineligible to purchase or possess firearms, a proposed business name, a business location and hours of operation, 76 and a $200 fee (recently raised from $30) .77
BATF has no discretion to reject a license application unless it determines that the information provided is not truthful or accurate. R. 178.32, 178.41-42 (1995); 57 Fed. Reg. 24,301 (1992) .
77 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (3) (1994). The license is good for three years, after which it may be renewed for another three year period for $90.
[Vol. 86 BATF has no reliable way to determine if license applicants have lied on their applications. 78 BATF sends the license applicant's name, social security number, and fingerprints to the FBI for a criminal records check. 7 9 However, the FBI's data base of criminal records is far from comprehensive; of the twenty-six million criminal records in the FBI system, little more than 54% are fully computerized. 0 Many states do not provide the FBI with updated and complete information for Interstate Identification Index (III). An estimated 2.8 million criminal records from California alone are not available through the 111.81 Thus, if willing to lie, a drug user, ex-felon, former mental patient, or person under the age of twenty-one has a good chance of obtaining a license. 82 An unsuccessful, but determined applicant could obtain a de facto license and all the advantages of a licensee by having a relative or friend obtain the license.
A large percentage of federally licensed dealers are not "dealers" at all, at least not in the sense that a dealer is the owner and operator of a store. 82 According to William Earle, BATF Deputy Associate Director for Regulatory Programs, the BATF is making an effort to visit and interview all new applicants and thoroughly check the information contained in the license application. Mr. Earle indicated, however, that if an individual really wanted to "scam the system," it probably could be done. Telephone interview with William Earle, BATF Deputy Associate Director for Regulatory Programs (July 6, 1995) .
83 To a certain extent, federal regulations regarding dealers appear contradictory. On the one hand, regulations require a dealer to operate out of "business premises," which are defined as "the property on which the.., dealing in firearms is or will be conducted. A private dwelling... shall not be recognized as coming within the meaning of the term." 27 C.F.R. §178.11. On the other hand, a dealer may be "any person who engages in such business or occupation on a part-time basis." Id. The second significant gap in the Brady regulatory regime is that the would-be purchaser of a handgun from an FEL is not required to provide fingerprints, but merely proof of identity based upon an "identification document." 8 8 If the FFL is satisfied that the identification document matches the person standing in front of him, he forwards the would-be purchaser's name, address, and eligibility information contained in the Brady Form to the CLEO for the background check. 8 9 An ineligible person who wished to purchase a firearm from an FFL could use readily available phony identification, i.e., a driver's license or some other identification that has the correct photo but an alias rather than the prospective purchaser's real name. There is a brisk market in such documents. 90 We do not know how scrupulously FFLs will try to match the photo I.D. to the person standing before them. We can certainly anticipate that some FFLs will accept as bona fides whatever identification is presented to them. Even a legitimate dealer, or the dealer's employee, who is making a good faith effort to comply with Brady, might not be able to match a poor photo to the person standing in front of him. Moreover, the dealer may be disinclined to turn down a prospective sale and alienate a customer if the photo is "in the ball park." It takes a certain amount of fortitude to 85 The Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibited mail order sales of firearms except from manufacturers to federally licensed dealers. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1994 [Vol. 86 challenge a customer, in effect, calling that person an imposter and a liar.
The third gap in the Brady regulatory apparatus is the ability of a would-be gun purchaser to use a straw man to effect the purchase for him. One can circumvent the entire Brady apparatus by having a spouse, friend, or fellow gang member, who does not have any disqualification, purchase the firearm and hand it over to the real purchaser.
The fourth, and perhaps most important, gap in the Brady regulatory scheme is its inapplicability to the secondary market. This market is the most common way criminals obtain handguns. An ineligible person can avoid Brady by purchasing a firearm in the secondary market from a street dealer, friend, relative, or person advertising in the newspaper. 9 1 The fifth gap in the Brady regulatory regime is the inability of the CLEO to determine whether the would-be purchaser is an illegal drug user, an ex-mental patient, an illegal alien, or a dishonorable dischargee. 92 Such data do not exist in any coherent or accessible form, and to the extent they do exist, they are not readily obtainable by CLEOs. 93 In fact, the CLEO need not attempt to contact hospitals and treatment centers since Brady provides only that the CLEO make a "reasonable effort" to determine whether the would-be purchaser falls into a prohibited category. 94 The BATE interprets this obligation as requiring "some minimal effort to check commonly available records." 9 5 A determined CLEO might direct an inquiry to the state department of mental health or even local mental hospitals (or psychiatric wings of general hospitals) and drug treatment centers, but 93 Moreover, it seems unlikely that a national data base containing such information will be created in the near future. The mental health and drug treatment communities would strongly oppose the collation of lists of mental and drug abuse patients on the ground that it infringes privacy and deters people from seeking treatment. such information is frequently deemed confidential. 96 Even if willing to provide information identifying patients, hospital and treatment centers may not maintain records in a form that allows easy and accurate identification of patients. Some state and federally funded drug treatment centers and hospitals maintain "client admission profiles" so this patient information may be sent to state record-keeping agencies.
9 7 The client admission profiles sent to these agencies, however, do not contain the name of the client, and are of limited use.
8
Mental health records present equally difficult problems for the CLEO and the creation of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Local court records contain information on adjudications of mental defectives and commitment hearings, but these records are difficult to search because of the decentralized nature of local court systems.
9 9 Further, many state mental patient data bases do not contain patient names, and private psychiatric hospitals do not provide patient information to state mental health agencies.
0
Obtaining information on illegal aliens is equally difficult. Although some records on illegal aliens are maintained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), it is impossible to determine exactly how many illegal aliens are in the United States. "Unfortunately for the purpose of identifying persons ineligible to purchase firearms, most illegal aliens enter the country clandestinely and have not been apprehended or identified by the INS. Therefore, we do not have records that identify the vast majority of persons who are illegal aliens in this country." 10 1
Records of dishonorable discharges are similarly inaccessible.
96 The Brady Act Task Group, in a report examining the progress of the National Instant Background Check System (NICS) required by Brady, conceded that "it will be difficult to obtain this information [on drug use] because of legal restrictions and because of the large number of [state and local hospital] data bases that must be integrated.... Changes in state confidentiality laws would be needed before states could readily transfer information about mental defectives and commitments to the NICS." BRADY TASK GRouP REPORT, supra note 79, at 3-4. See also Michael Sznajderman, Crime Bill Leaving Loopholes, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 1, 1993, at Al (explaining that Florida privacy laws regarding medical records prevent CLEOs from determining whether a purchaser is a former mental patient). [Vol. 86
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The Defense Manpower Data Center in California maintains a computerized data base of all persons discharged, dishonorably or otherwise, from the armed forces. 10 2 Currently, these records are not readily accessible by CLEOs. Persons discharged from the armed forces wishing to obtain a service record must make a written request to the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, which receives approximately 30,000 requests per week.' 0 3 Even if CLEOs had access to the California data base, the lag time between discharge and entry into the computer system (two to four months) provides a dishonorable dischargee with sufficient time to purchase a firearm.
104
Despite defining a number of social categories whose members are too irresponsible to be permitted to purchase a firearm, the Brady machinery really only deals with one category, that of ex-felons. However, even checking criminal records is not without difficulty, given the varying degree of completeness from state to state. 10 5 Furthermore, name checks, unlike fingerprints, are notoriously inaccurate.
[Alpproximately 50 percent of the cases in which persons appear to have a criminal history record based upon an initial name search are eventually found to be false hits. Conversely, it is likely that some purchasers wvith criminal records will go unidentified as they use fictitious information. In short, name searches are not as accurate as fingerprint identifications.
106
The large number of false hits as a result of name checks makes one wonder how many of the 40,000 sales allegedly rejected under Brady The accuracy of criminal records was a prominent issue in the history of the Brady bill. Congressional Republicans favored an electronic on-line system that would enable either the firearms dealer or the CLEO to approve or disapprove a proposed handgun sale immediately. The U.S. Department ofJustice produced several reports showing that only a few states had the capacity to implement such a system and that nationally, 40-60% of felony criminal records were not readily accessible via computer. In fact, as of 1989, only ten states had fully computerized criminal record systems. Ultimately, the Brady bill requires all states to develop such on-line systems by November 1998. At that point, it is anticipated that the name check will resemble a credit card check and the waiting period aspect of Brady will disappear.
The BATF is optimistic that NICS will be implemented by 1998. Telephone Interview with William Earle, supra note 82. Currently, $200 million has been earmarked for grants to state and local governments to update and computerize criminal records. Additionally, the BATF is working with other federal agencies, such as the INS and the Departments of Defense and State, to create data bases on illegal aliens, dishonorable military discharges and individuals who have renounced U.S. citizenship. Id.
106 1988 House Hearings, supra note 80, at 22 (statement of PaulJ. McNulty, Acting Director, Office of Policy Development, Department ofJustice). According to police in Austin, Texas, 85% of rejected sales are later approved. The initial rejection is due to similarities between the purchaser's name and the name of a convicted felon. Clintonites Spin Brady Act "Success,"Am. Rim, Sept. 1994, at 24. are attributable to false hits.
E. ENFORCING THE BRADY LAW
How is the Brady law to be enforced? Is it even meant to be enforced? How will anyone know if a licensed gun dealer sells a handgun without following the rules laid down in Brady? What happens if the dealer fails to follow the rules?
As the Cook, Molliconi and Cole article indicates, neither state nor local law enforcement agencies devote significant resources to monitoring the federally imposed regulation of handgun sales and may be unable and/or disinclined to enhance their monitoring efforts. 10 7 Indeed, some CLEOs who resent being ordered by Congress to take time out from their other law enforcement duties to conduct the Brady background checks, and to write letters of explanations to rejected handgun purchasers, have brought suits challenging the background check provision on Tenth Amendment grounds. 108 We can safely assume that these CLEOs would be actively hostile to any directive requiring an even more ambitious monitoring effort. Even CLEOs who harbor no resentment against Congress are unlikely to have the necessary resources to devote to a significant monitoring effort. In other words, a significant enforcement effort would either require a major infusion of police resources or a major re-ordering of police priorities.
BATF is the federal agency in charge of enforcing Brady and all other federal gun control laws and regulations, and is the agency in charge of regulating the alcohol and tobacco industries. But with only 1,000 inspectors and 1,200 agents in the firearms area, BATF hardly has the capacity and resources to monitor more than 200,000 firearms licensees. 109 After the passage of Brady, no additional funds were appropriated for new agents and inspectors. In effect, the agency was told to add the enforcement of Brady to its other responsibilities. It responded by diverting resources from tobacco and alcohol enforcement, and from headquarters and office operations to Brady enforce-ment. 110 Of course, there are limits to the amount of diversion that can be accomplished. The resources devoted to Brady enforcement still fall far short of what would be even minimally necessary for a credible enforcement effort, which should include an annual inspection of every FFL. To be sure, BATF does not have the resources each year to inspect every FFL. In fact, only 10% of all FFLs have ever been inspected. 1 1 ' BATF inspections tend to concentrate on the large department stores and legitimate businesses, not the fly-by-night operators.
1 2 To speak of "monitoring" or "inspecting" the FFLs gives no indication of the task that would be involved; there is no easy way to enforce Brady by monitoring sales or auditing sellers."1 3 In fact, any audit of sellers would probably require a coordinated audit of the CLEO in thatjurisdiction as well, and would begin with an inspection of records required to be kept by FFIs, principally BATF Form 4473 and the Brady Form. In theory, to audit compliance with Brady, the BATF inspector could compare the number of purchases using Form 4473 with the number of background checks conducted by the CLEO."1 5 This assumes that the FF'Ls are scrupulously honest and accurate in their record keeping. Even if they are, all that would be revealed would be a numerical discrepancy, not the identity of a prohibited purchaser. It would be extremely time consuming to go through each sales record and attempt to match it with completed background check. The next step would be to somehow prove that the FFL had knowingly made an illegal, unapproved sale. An unscrupulous dealer would undoubtedly fail to record illegal sales. Therefore, in many cases discrepancies between sales and checks could easily be explained by negligence or poor record-keeping.
In theory, violations could also be detected through a compari- Another difficulty in enforcing Brady arises in criminal prosecutions. Perhaps some criminal suspect or defendant will turn the state's evidence against an FFL in exchange for a favorable plea bargain, or perhaps BATF will mount a sting operation in which agents pose as ineligible buyers and try to affect purchases. 1 8 If the BATF could prove that a dealer knowingly carried out an unapproved firearms transfer, and if the U.S. Attorney could be persuaded to prosecute the case, there could be a successful prosecution. 1 19 A BATF official whom we interviewed told us that if the Bureau presents a case to the U.S. Attorney's Office based solely on Brady violations, it is "unlikely to have much prosecutorial appeal." 20 According to this official, the Bureau relies more on the deterrent aspect of Brady rather than on using Brady as a prosecutorial weapon; this casts doubt on Brady's effectiveness.
II. "THICKENING" THE REGULATORY WEB
This brief exegesis demonstrates that there is no reason to be optimistic that Brady will successfully keep firearms away from dangerous persons. Thus, gun control advocates probably will attempt to thicken the regulatory web. Indeed, when Brady passed, many gun control advocates and observers noted that it represented the "first step" in the fight against gun-related violence. 12 Having illuminated the largely symbolic significance of Brady, one might have expected Cook, Molliconi & Cole to recommend folding up the regulatory tent in favor of some other type of enforcement. To the contrary, in a show of heroic faith in regulation, they suggest that Congress expand the regulatory regime to bring the secondary market under the Brady umbrella.
While Cook, Molliconi & Cole do not provide details, they propose a system whereby all handgun transfers must go through "a licensed dealer or law enforcement agency. All legal transfers would then be governed by the same permitting and paperwork requirements as are currently required for FFL sales."
125 This presumably means that if A (a seller) wants to give or sell his gun to B (a buyer), both must appear before C, an FFL, and submit some documents in order to consummate the sale. As under Brady, the FFL would forward the name to the CLEO for a background check, and A and B would have to delay the sale until they were informed by C that the CLEO approved their transaction. Of course, B (the purchaser) could evade this scheme just as he could avoid Brady, simply by having a straw man, his friend D, stand in his place before C (the FEL). But let us make the unlikely assumption that B has no friends or relatives eligible under Brady or willing to act as straw men. Let us further assume that, desperate to purchase a handgun, B tentatively strikes a purchase agreement with A (the seller). Nothing would prevent A from ignoring the law and consummating a private sale to B, other than the deterrence generated by Brady. Law enforcement officials would not know that A sold this gun to B. A is not an FFL and certainly is not obligated to maintain any records on secondhand sales of guns. There is no registry of the 200 million firearms owned by civilians.' 26 A can be confident that no police officer or BATF inspector will appear at his door demanding that he produce a particular firearm or, if he cannot produce it, explain satisfactorily what happened to it. The Cook Amendment is completely unenforceable.
Suppose that, one day, authorities arrest B, an ex-felon, for possessing the handgun which A sold him. And suppose that the local police, anxious to enforce Brady, ask B where he obtained the handgun. This scenario is unlikely to result in A's prosecution. B might well refuse to say anything. He might lie, saying he does not remember where he got the gun. If he had a malicious sense of humor, B might say that he purchased the handgun from a federally licensed dealer, but did not have a receipt. 12 7 In other words, he could say anything.
However, let us suppose that B, hoping for leniency, names A as the person who transferred the handgun to him in blatant disregard of the Cook Amendment. Now the police seek out A. Under interrogation for suspicion of knowingly violating the Cook Amendment, A might break down, admit knowingly selling the handgun to an ineligible purchaser, and throw himself on the mercy of the court. More likely, A would either remain silent or lie. No proof exists that A sold the handgun. Even if there were witnesses to the sale, they could not positively identify the particular handgun that A sold to B. In fact, if A is a street seller who does not keep careful records, he himself will have no idea whether he sold that particular handgun to B.
A sophisticated A could admit the transfer, but say that he made it lawfully through his friend C, who, as far as A knows, is or was an FFL (at least that's what C told him) who obtained the necessary approval from the CLEO. A could claim that he believed C and had no reason to demand a signed receipt or other proof or, if he once had such receipts, not to have kept them all this time. "No, A doesn't know where C is now." Indeed, even if C is found and denies knowing anything about B's gun, A may claim that C is the liar, a person who masquerades as an FFL in order to collect a "broker's fee" on every street sale of a handgun.
This hypothetical demonstrates that the Cook Amendment, which would extend Brady to all handgun transfers, is likely to be un-enforceable, even if there were adequate police resources and top priority given to its enforcement. Thus, the Amendment would contribute little to keeping handguns out of the hands of dangerous people.
B. NATIONAL FIREARMS LICENSING
In the wake of Brady, a number of proposals have surfaced for more federal regulation of handguns. One failed bill, the Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, would have established a national handgun licensing system. 128 No person would be able to purchase or possess a firearm without such a license. 12 9 Persons ineligible under Brady to purchase a firearm would have remained ineligible for a license. This bill would apply to handgun sales in both the primary and secondary market, forbidding any individua, not just FFLs, knowingly to sell a handgun to an unlicensed purchaser. 3 0 Under the Act, state CLEOs would issue handgun licenses.
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Licenses would be valid for no longer than two years. Licensees could purchase and possess no more than twenty firearms. 3 2 In order to obtain a firearms license, a person would have to demonstrate firearms proficiency and knowledge of safety procedures.' 3 3 All license holders would be recorded in state-operated computerized data bases. Implementing such a licensing system would require a network of local firearms licensing offices in every county to determine the applicant's firearms proficiency and knowledge of firearms safety. While the bill would create a massive bureaucratic apparatus, it would be no more successful in controlling secondary sales than the Cook Amendment to the Brady law. Presumably, under the national licensing system, a would-be handgun purchaser would have to show a valid license to the dealer in the primary market or to the seller in the 128 H.R. 3932, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1994). 129 § 101(a).
I
131 § 101(a) (4) (A). 132 § 204(a). 133 § 101(a) (4) (C) (iv). It would be complicated and expensive to create a nationwide chain of firearms offices whose major function would be to test whether purchasers (or all current owners) employ safety precautions. Quite likely, after a while, the purpose of the licensing scheme would come to be seen as assuring competence in target shooting. Arguably, it is not lack of skill or marksmanship which constitutes the firearms problem in the U.S., but the irresponsible and criminal misuse of firearms. The same is probably true of the traffic problem; irresponsibility rather than incompetency is the main problem.
Consider that although the overwhelming majority of drivers have valid licenses, there are hundreds of thousands of traffic accidents a year attributable to irresponsible driving. In 1992, in New York State alone, there were 458,554 traffic accidents and 2,401 deaths. NEw YORK STATE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 448 (1994). secondary market. As we have seen in the discussion of the Cook Amendment, this requirement could be circumvented by: (1) having a properly licensed friend purchase the gun; (2) finding a seller who was not concerned about adhering to the licensing requirement; or (3) using a fraudulent license. A person charged with selling a handgun to an unlicensed person could claim that he thought the person did have a valid license. It would be hard to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt unless the government devoted significant resources to "buy and bust" and sting operations targeting illegal gun and phony license sales. However, even buy and bust and sting operations have not succeeded in suppressing drug sales. It would be even more difficult to enforce a system of handgun licensing than it is to enforce the driver's license system. Driving without a valid license is a very common offense in the United States. In New York State alone, approximately 100,000 persons are convicted of this offense each year, and this is surely just the tip of the iceberg; one can only wonder what is the true rate of driving without a valid license.' 3 5
Finally, and most importantly, we already have considerable experience in the United States with firearms licenses. In many state and local jurisdictions it is a crime to purchase or possess a firearm without a license. 136 Obviously, these licensing laws have not prevented criminals and other people from obtaining handguns.
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C.
NATIONAL FIREARMS REGISTRATION Perhaps the lesson to draw from the previous discussion is that even more regulation will be necessary to control the secondary mar-ket so as to keep firearms out of the hands of dangerotis and irresponsible persons. Thus, the last form of regulation that we will consider is firearms registration. If firearms registration were married to the Brady law, the Cook Amendment, and the national licensing system, would there finally be an effective regulatory apparatus?
Let us first consider the system of automobile registration as a model for firearms registration. If one wishes to purchase an automobile from a dealer (the primary market) or a private individual (the secondary market), one must register the automobile with the state department of motor vehicles in order to get license plates and a valid registration sticker that must be openly displayed on the windshield. The responsibility for registration is on the purchaser and registration is a mechanical process. The vehicle owner must merely pay a fee and show proof of insurance. Registration is open to all; no one is refused. There is little reason, except pecuniary, for a purchaser to seek to avoid registration since everyone is eligible to register a vehicle.' 3 8 Registration is cancelled in the event that the individual ceases to maintain appropriate insurance or fails to pay the periodic registration renewal fee.
A secondary vehicle sale must also go through the registration system. The seller must sign over his registration to the purchaser, and the purchaser must send the signed registration, confirming the transfer, to the department of motor vehicles. The seller must turn his license plates over to the department of motor vehicles and cancel his insurance. He has a strong incentive to do so unless he wishes to continue to be responsible for insuring the transferred car and for any accidents in which it is involved.
A firearms registration system would presumably require the firearms purchaser to record his possession of the firearm (identified by serial number) with a federal, state, or local agency. In exchange for a fee, the registered firearms owner would obtain a registration card or sticker which would constitute proof of registration. Sale of the firearm would require that the agency be notified of the new owner's identity and the new owner would have to obtain his own registration card for the weapon. It is questionable whether everyone could register as owner of a firearm (following the automobile registration model) or whether certain categories of presumptively dangerous and irresponsible persons would be ineligible to register. If the latter course were followed, then a large number of people would have an incentive ing handguns out of the hands of dangerous and irresponsible persons, as anything more than a sop to the widespread fear of crime and to the feeling that "something has to be done" about guns. The Brady bill apparently plays into a strong American faith in the capacity of law and regulation to shape behavior. On its face, this faith is curious given the extent of law and regulatory evasion, especially in the area of gun control.
There is little reason to accept the claim that Brady is preventing 40,000 dangerous and irresponsible persons per year from obtaining handguns. The figure itself is suspect, especially because of the name checking system's inaccuracy. Moreover, the Brady regulatory regime is easily evaded through purchases on the secondary market, which are completely unregulated. Finally, Brady is not really enforceable, and even if it were, enforcement would be dependent upon resources and commitments that have not yet been forthcoming.
It is likely that, as time passes, Brady, although once heralded as a significant step toward curbing violent crime, will be demoted to a "small step" and more regulation will be demanded. Cook, Molliconi and Cole have shown that the robust and unregulated secondary market in handguns, in effect, makes any regulation of the primary market alone essentially irrelevant. But their proposal, to bring the secondary market under the Brady umbrella, offers little reason for optimism. 143 Extending Brady to the secondary market would be complex, expensive, and ineffective. Many different types of evasion would still be quite simple.
Thus, it is likely that the regulatory mind will turn to other strategies to create a thickened web of regulation that will make it difficult for irresponsible and dangerous persons to obtain handguns. But no such plausible system has, at least to our knowledge, yet been proposed. There is no reason why a federal licensing system would be any more successful than existing state and local licensing systems. Likewise, a registration system offers little promise in terms of crime control. It would, of course, succeed in expanding the regulatory state.
Perhaps it would make sense to give up on the idea that there is some system of regulation that can prevent criminals from obtaining handguns. It might be far better to put our energy and resources elsewhere, especially in holding the line on carry permits and vigorously enforcing the criminal law against carying firearms without a license.
143 One BATF official whom we interviewed opined that extending federal gun control laws and regulations to the secondary market would be extremely complex and "maybe unworkable." Telephone interview with William Earle, supra note 82. It would certainly be beyond the capacity of BATF to enforce. James Q. Wilson recently proposed that local police officers mount a more vigorous enforcement effort against illegal gun possession on the streets through "stop and frisks."' 44 This may be a sensible strategy which has the potential to provide a number of crime control payoffs.
145
Unlike the matter of gun possession, on which the society is sharply divided, there is a unanimity in condemning the use of firearms to commit crimes. Thus, there is no political or practical obstacle to ensuring severe sentences for gun offenders. This should be the top priority for American law enforcement. At a minimum, it should be recognized that the premise underlying federal gun control policy-strong gun laws keep guns out of the wrong hands-has little, if any effect, in disarming ex-felons and other ineligibles.
144 James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 20, 1994, at 47 . A stop and frisk involves a pat-down of an individual's outer clothing based on a reasonable suspicion by police that the individual is carrying weapons or other contraband. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1968) . 145 Wilson's proposal, however, would work only if a small number of people have lawful carry permits. If carry permits become as-of-right and plentiful, a police officer would have no basis for reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk an individual, much less probable cause to believe that a person carrying a gun was doing so in violation of the law. Therefore, there would be no lawful reason to investigate whether the person has a license.
